Now on a different point, over this past week there has been a quite a bit about Nuclear materials, either missing or stolen or miss handled or whatever. I remember it was not to long ago that they did a sting in WVA and a fake company bought enough radioactive material to make a good sized dirty bomb.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/11/AR2007071101895.html
Guards alseep on the job at a nuclear reactor, in Philidelphi PA.
http://www.nationalterroralert.com/updates/2007/09/25/peach-bottom-nuclear-power-plant-security-guards-asleep-on-the-job/
Our own Air Force flying 6 nuclear weapons across ur Country.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20427730/
So it is obvious that we could be in a lot of trouble. It does not take a lot of nuclear material to make a dirty bomb. Although not very effective in harming people, but is a tool of terrorists. It imparts fear and unsettledness to the people targeted and those that know about it. In the right place it can cast a lot of time and money to clean up, but with it comes no use of the area or damage to infasturcture. A series of them could hamper recovery of this economy. So it would be good you to consider this also, and that is why i copied the articles for you.
US missile crew sleep with nuclear code
Agence France-Presse
Friday, July 25, 2008 (Washington)
Members of US Air Force nuclear missile crew face disciplinary action for going to sleep while in possession of an invalidated nuclear launch code component, the air force disclosed.The breach occurred July 12 at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, the scene of two other recent high profile lapses involving nuclear weapons or nuclear-related components, according to the spokesman on Thursday.An investigation into the violation of procedures concluded that no compromise of the classified material occurred,'' the Air Force said in a statement.The nuclear launch code component is a device that enables the missile crew to issue an electronic command to launch a nuclear missile. The codes are changed on a scheduled, recurring basis.The four member missile crew changed the codes in the underground launch control centre during their watch and had gone ''top side'' to an above ground missile alert facility with the component containing the old codes to await transportation back to the main base, the air force said.While awaiting transportation, they went into a crew rest area with bunks where they fell asleep, a violation of the rules, according to the air force.''An investigation revealed the codes had remained secured in containers using locks which combos were known only to the crew during the entirety of the incident,'' the air force said.''Additionally, access to the MAF (missile alert facility) was continually controlled by air force security forces and the codes had been superseded and were unusable,'' it said.The breach was reported by one of the missile crewmembers, Paoli said.
Agence France-Presse
Friday, July 25, 2008 (Washington)
Members of US Air Force nuclear missile crew face disciplinary action for going to sleep while in possession of an invalidated nuclear launch code component, the air force disclosed.The breach occurred July 12 at Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota, the scene of two other recent high profile lapses involving nuclear weapons or nuclear-related components, according to the spokesman on Thursday.An investigation into the violation of procedures concluded that no compromise of the classified material occurred,'' the Air Force said in a statement.The nuclear launch code component is a device that enables the missile crew to issue an electronic command to launch a nuclear missile. The codes are changed on a scheduled, recurring basis.The four member missile crew changed the codes in the underground launch control centre during their watch and had gone ''top side'' to an above ground missile alert facility with the component containing the old codes to await transportation back to the main base, the air force said.While awaiting transportation, they went into a crew rest area with bunks where they fell asleep, a violation of the rules, according to the air force.''An investigation revealed the codes had remained secured in containers using locks which combos were known only to the crew during the entirety of the incident,'' the air force said.''Additionally, access to the MAF (missile alert facility) was continually controlled by air force security forces and the codes had been superseded and were unusable,'' it said.The breach was reported by one of the missile crewmembers, Paoli said.
Nuclear material often unchecked
Shannon Bond UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONALThursday, July 24, 2008
Confusion and miscommunication at border crossings allowed large amounts of potentially dangerous materials to enter the United States without adequate checks, a government investigation has revealed.
In a report released last week, the Government Accountability Office, Congress' investigative arm, called on Border Patrol officers and nuclear regulators to do a better job tracking and detecting radioactive materials.
Such materials, which have many legitimate uses in scientific research, medical treatments and industry, are licensed by 35 states as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal nuclear watchdog. When they are brought into the country, the Border Patrol is supposed to check those licenses.
But GAO investigators found that "at one port of entry, (U.S. Customs and Border Protection) officers were confused about when to verify licenses and were routinely permitting large shipments of neutron-emitting material to enter the country."
At other crossings, border officers told investigators that they were following outdated rules for checking cargo.
This is "particularly troubling," the report said, not only because it violates official policy but also because some radioactive substances could be used to make nuclear weapons or dirty bombs, which use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material.
Radiation detectors scan nearly all the truck cargo that crosses daily into the United States from Mexico and Canada. The scanners are sensitive enough to detect even tiny levels of radiation, such as traces found in bananas, ceramics and even people who have undergone medical procedures, the report said.
In 2006, undercover GAO investigators successfully brought radioactive material across the border using fake licenses. In response, the Department of Homeland Security instituted rules requiring border officers to contact authorities if a shipment gives off more than trace amounts of radiation to verify that all licenses are valid.
But that updated policy was not communicated to all U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel.
"While we found officers generally were aware that radioactive materials and sources must be licensed, they typically did not take steps to verify licenses," the GAO said, and, as a result, the "task of preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials is made more difficult."
Border officials have been issued reminders of the agency's policy, said Customs and Border Protection spokeswoman Erlinda Byrd. "People are reporting in the field that they are including it in their standard operating procedures."
The GAO's concerns are "well-founded," said P.J. Crowley, a national security analyst at the Center for American Progress.
Although the likelihood of terrorists smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States is "extremely remote," Mr. Crowley said, "if a terrorist is going to use an unconventional weapon, it is probably going to be a radiological device."
But Mr. Crowley said it isn't easy to find a balance that keeps dangerous materials secure while also allowing access to them by scientists, doctors and companies that have legitimate uses for them.
"Radioactive material is important in many areas, so you have to have available sources while making sure that you're keeping track of who has it and where it's going, and how it's being used, and also how it's being disposed of."
This is where the nuclear regulators play an important part by tightly controlling who gets access to potentially dangerous material.
"If you have an effective system of licensing and then an effective system of monitoring the movement and use of radioactive material [in the United States and other countries], then that takes the pressure off the border," Mr. Crowley said. "The border will still be important, but the border should be the last point of defense, not the only point of defense."
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is creating a Web-based system that border officers and other officials can use to check licenses. But the project is more than three years behind schedule and may not include state-issued licenses, which make up more than 80 percent of all licenses in the United States, the GAO said.
"The complexity here is that this is not just a federal responsibility," Mr. Crowley said. "So part of this is making sure there is effective sharing of information across different jurisdictions so that you have as complete a picture as possible."
Shannon Bond UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONALThursday, July 24, 2008
Confusion and miscommunication at border crossings allowed large amounts of potentially dangerous materials to enter the United States without adequate checks, a government investigation has revealed.
In a report released last week, the Government Accountability Office, Congress' investigative arm, called on Border Patrol officers and nuclear regulators to do a better job tracking and detecting radioactive materials.
Such materials, which have many legitimate uses in scientific research, medical treatments and industry, are licensed by 35 states as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal nuclear watchdog. When they are brought into the country, the Border Patrol is supposed to check those licenses.
But GAO investigators found that "at one port of entry, (U.S. Customs and Border Protection) officers were confused about when to verify licenses and were routinely permitting large shipments of neutron-emitting material to enter the country."
At other crossings, border officers told investigators that they were following outdated rules for checking cargo.
This is "particularly troubling," the report said, not only because it violates official policy but also because some radioactive substances could be used to make nuclear weapons or dirty bombs, which use conventional explosives to disperse radioactive material.
Radiation detectors scan nearly all the truck cargo that crosses daily into the United States from Mexico and Canada. The scanners are sensitive enough to detect even tiny levels of radiation, such as traces found in bananas, ceramics and even people who have undergone medical procedures, the report said.
In 2006, undercover GAO investigators successfully brought radioactive material across the border using fake licenses. In response, the Department of Homeland Security instituted rules requiring border officers to contact authorities if a shipment gives off more than trace amounts of radiation to verify that all licenses are valid.
But that updated policy was not communicated to all U.S. Customs and Border Protection personnel.
"While we found officers generally were aware that radioactive materials and sources must be licensed, they typically did not take steps to verify licenses," the GAO said, and, as a result, the "task of preventing the smuggling of radioactive materials is made more difficult."
Border officials have been issued reminders of the agency's policy, said Customs and Border Protection spokeswoman Erlinda Byrd. "People are reporting in the field that they are including it in their standard operating procedures."
The GAO's concerns are "well-founded," said P.J. Crowley, a national security analyst at the Center for American Progress.
Although the likelihood of terrorists smuggling a nuclear weapon into the United States is "extremely remote," Mr. Crowley said, "if a terrorist is going to use an unconventional weapon, it is probably going to be a radiological device."
But Mr. Crowley said it isn't easy to find a balance that keeps dangerous materials secure while also allowing access to them by scientists, doctors and companies that have legitimate uses for them.
"Radioactive material is important in many areas, so you have to have available sources while making sure that you're keeping track of who has it and where it's going, and how it's being used, and also how it's being disposed of."
This is where the nuclear regulators play an important part by tightly controlling who gets access to potentially dangerous material.
"If you have an effective system of licensing and then an effective system of monitoring the movement and use of radioactive material [in the United States and other countries], then that takes the pressure off the border," Mr. Crowley said. "The border will still be important, but the border should be the last point of defense, not the only point of defense."
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is creating a Web-based system that border officers and other officials can use to check licenses. But the project is more than three years behind schedule and may not include state-issued licenses, which make up more than 80 percent of all licenses in the United States, the GAO said.
"The complexity here is that this is not just a federal responsibility," Mr. Crowley said. "So part of this is making sure there is effective sharing of information across different jurisdictions so that you have as complete a picture as possible."
Nuclear fuel to be moved
300 tons of spent fuel in Kazakhstan
Kelly Hearn (Contact)Thursday, July 24, 2008
Kazakhstan's military forces this summer held a training exercise to thwart a fake terrorist assault on a Soviet-built nuclear facility near Almaty, the country's former capital located on its southeastern border.
In the exercise, a reactor was the simulated target of terrorists trying to steal some of the deadliest nuclear material ever made. It came, by no coincidence, as U.S. and Kazakh officials put the finishing touches on a plan to move 300 tons of used nuclear fuel from a decommissioned Soviet nuclear reactor near the port city of Aktau on the Caspian Sea not far from Iran.
Starting early next year, the spent fuel will be transported from the Aktau-based facility via railway cars in five shipments of 60 tons each. The fuel will be stored in a permanent inland storage site at the Baikal-1 facility at Semipalatinsk, a former Soviet nuclear testing site near Kazakhstan's remote northeastern border with Russia.
If reprocessed, the fuel would yield about 3 tons of pure plutonium.
"This material is like fruit from the forbidden tree," Erlan A. Idrissov, Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States, told The Washington Times. "So it only makes sense to keep it as secure as possible."
Plans to move the fuel by rail across the steppes of central Asia go back more than a decade, when officials were scrambling to contain the black-market dispersal of the former Soviet Union's atomic arsenal.
In 1999, the Kazakh government signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy to shut down and secure the Aktau-based BN-350 reactor, a commercial-scale "breeder reactor" originally loaded with highly enriched uranium, a potential fuel for nuclear weapons.
Ex-officials and experts interviewed for this story said that security planners saw Iran's proximity to the reactor as a possible security threat.
"It is especially pure and very attractive for making nuclear bombs," said Laura Holgate, a nuclear expert at the Nuclear Threat Initiative think tank in Washington.
Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University's Belfer Center, which analyzes proliferation issues, estimates that the plutonium inside was more than 97 percent pure. By comparison, the fuel used by the U.S. in its arsenal is about 90 percent pure.
300 tons of spent fuel in Kazakhstan
Kelly Hearn (Contact)Thursday, July 24, 2008
Kazakhstan's military forces this summer held a training exercise to thwart a fake terrorist assault on a Soviet-built nuclear facility near Almaty, the country's former capital located on its southeastern border.
In the exercise, a reactor was the simulated target of terrorists trying to steal some of the deadliest nuclear material ever made. It came, by no coincidence, as U.S. and Kazakh officials put the finishing touches on a plan to move 300 tons of used nuclear fuel from a decommissioned Soviet nuclear reactor near the port city of Aktau on the Caspian Sea not far from Iran.
Starting early next year, the spent fuel will be transported from the Aktau-based facility via railway cars in five shipments of 60 tons each. The fuel will be stored in a permanent inland storage site at the Baikal-1 facility at Semipalatinsk, a former Soviet nuclear testing site near Kazakhstan's remote northeastern border with Russia.
If reprocessed, the fuel would yield about 3 tons of pure plutonium.
"This material is like fruit from the forbidden tree," Erlan A. Idrissov, Kazakhstan's ambassador to the United States, told The Washington Times. "So it only makes sense to keep it as secure as possible."
Plans to move the fuel by rail across the steppes of central Asia go back more than a decade, when officials were scrambling to contain the black-market dispersal of the former Soviet Union's atomic arsenal.
In 1999, the Kazakh government signed an agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy to shut down and secure the Aktau-based BN-350 reactor, a commercial-scale "breeder reactor" originally loaded with highly enriched uranium, a potential fuel for nuclear weapons.
Ex-officials and experts interviewed for this story said that security planners saw Iran's proximity to the reactor as a possible security threat.
"It is especially pure and very attractive for making nuclear bombs," said Laura Holgate, a nuclear expert at the Nuclear Threat Initiative think tank in Washington.
Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University's Belfer Center, which analyzes proliferation issues, estimates that the plutonium inside was more than 97 percent pure. By comparison, the fuel used by the U.S. in its arsenal is about 90 percent pure.
"It is better [quality] than the plutonium used in the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile," Mr. Bunn said.
Since it takes 10 to 15 pounds of plutonium to make a bomb, the Aktau reactor fuel contained enough for about 400 atomic bombs similar to one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in the final days of World War II.
At the time, officials in the Clinton administration cited Iran's proximity to the reactor as a reason for moving the fuel - concerns that deepened after Tehran asked to open a consulate in Aktau, a city with scant economic or political clout.
Mr. Idrissov, the Kazakh ambassador, said the security concerns over Tehran's intentions were probably overblown.
"The plan [to open an Iranian consulate] never materialized," Mr. Idrissov said, dismissing the idea that Tehran had interest in getting close to the Aktau-based reactor.
"Iran could simply have had the foresight to see that Aktau was going to become commercially important," he said.
Indeed, Aktau has become a major hub for Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry.
Although many of the details remain classified, the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration has worked with the Kazakh government and helped fund major upgrades at both ends to make the shipment possible.
Some nuclear experts regard the effort as an anachronism. They dismiss the idea that terrorists would hijack a heavily guarded train, steal a 60-ton cask and get it to a reprocessing factory with the giant vats of acid needed to extract the plutonium.
Leonard Spector, a former Energy Department official who was responsible for advancing the program in the 1990s, dismissed the idea of an attack orchestrated by the Iranian government. But he said threats still exist.
Since it takes 10 to 15 pounds of plutonium to make a bomb, the Aktau reactor fuel contained enough for about 400 atomic bombs similar to one dropped on Nagasaki, Japan, in the final days of World War II.
At the time, officials in the Clinton administration cited Iran's proximity to the reactor as a reason for moving the fuel - concerns that deepened after Tehran asked to open a consulate in Aktau, a city with scant economic or political clout.
Mr. Idrissov, the Kazakh ambassador, said the security concerns over Tehran's intentions were probably overblown.
"The plan [to open an Iranian consulate] never materialized," Mr. Idrissov said, dismissing the idea that Tehran had interest in getting close to the Aktau-based reactor.
"Iran could simply have had the foresight to see that Aktau was going to become commercially important," he said.
Indeed, Aktau has become a major hub for Kazakhstan's oil and gas industry.
Although many of the details remain classified, the Energy Department's National Nuclear Security Administration has worked with the Kazakh government and helped fund major upgrades at both ends to make the shipment possible.
Some nuclear experts regard the effort as an anachronism. They dismiss the idea that terrorists would hijack a heavily guarded train, steal a 60-ton cask and get it to a reprocessing factory with the giant vats of acid needed to extract the plutonium.
Leonard Spector, a former Energy Department official who was responsible for advancing the program in the 1990s, dismissed the idea of an attack orchestrated by the Iranian government. But he said threats still exist.
"You have elements in Iran that aren't necessarily well supervised, and you can't dismiss that they could act on their own," he said.
Even so, Mr. Spector said security at the Aktau-based facility is substantial.
"It's not like situations elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, where we had to worry about one person sneaking out discs of weapons grade uranium in his pocket," he said.
Ms. Holgate, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said that some terrorists might be willing to die to get the material.
"One question is how self-protecting the material is," she said. "Does it have so much radiation that a terrorist trying to process it would die from a massive radiation dose? Even if that were the case, a terrorist may not care that he or she dies."
In the 1990s, nuclear proliferation experts were divided on what to do with the fuel. Some favored leaving the material in the protected facilities at Aktau, Mr. Spector said.
Transferring the material is an expensive, dangerous venture requiring infrastructure upgrades and possibly garnering only incremental security gains, he said.
"We didn't take the decision regarding moving the fuel lightly," Mr. Spector said.
He said the decision to move the fuel may also have been political for Kazakhstan, a country he described as a faithful U.S. partner in nonproliferation efforts.
Harvard's Mr. Bunn agreed.
"The main reason this is being done is because years ago the U.S. government signed an agreement with the Kazakhs that committed the U.S. government to do this," Mr. Bunn said.
Moving the fuel, he said, has "some good housekeeping merit. But then the question is whether that virtue is worth the current cost estimate for the program."
U.S. officials said the Kazakh government is paying for the transportation costs, roughly calculated to be up to $30 million. However, the Kazakh Embassy did not confirm those numbers.
The U.S. government has funded extensive upgrades to facilities in both Aktau and Semipalatinsk.
In an e-mail response to questions submitted by The Times, officials at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provided details of the operation, saying the plan was motivated by security needs - namely a desire to move the material out of a population center and to protect a primary oil port from potential nuclear sabotage.
But the officials could not immediately say how much the U.S. government has spent.
Mr. Bunn of Harvard, who reviewed federal budget documents, said the total cost of canning, curing and shipping the spent fuel runs close to $175 million.
A Government Accountability Office official said the agency has yet to produce a report on the program.
"We cover many nuclear nonproliferation programs but haven't focused on this project," said Gene Aloise, director of GAO's nuclear nonproliferation work. "Perhaps this article will spark some interest."
Even so, Mr. Spector said security at the Aktau-based facility is substantial.
"It's not like situations elsewhere in the former Soviet Union, where we had to worry about one person sneaking out discs of weapons grade uranium in his pocket," he said.
Ms. Holgate, of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, said that some terrorists might be willing to die to get the material.
"One question is how self-protecting the material is," she said. "Does it have so much radiation that a terrorist trying to process it would die from a massive radiation dose? Even if that were the case, a terrorist may not care that he or she dies."
In the 1990s, nuclear proliferation experts were divided on what to do with the fuel. Some favored leaving the material in the protected facilities at Aktau, Mr. Spector said.
Transferring the material is an expensive, dangerous venture requiring infrastructure upgrades and possibly garnering only incremental security gains, he said.
"We didn't take the decision regarding moving the fuel lightly," Mr. Spector said.
He said the decision to move the fuel may also have been political for Kazakhstan, a country he described as a faithful U.S. partner in nonproliferation efforts.
Harvard's Mr. Bunn agreed.
"The main reason this is being done is because years ago the U.S. government signed an agreement with the Kazakhs that committed the U.S. government to do this," Mr. Bunn said.
Moving the fuel, he said, has "some good housekeeping merit. But then the question is whether that virtue is worth the current cost estimate for the program."
U.S. officials said the Kazakh government is paying for the transportation costs, roughly calculated to be up to $30 million. However, the Kazakh Embassy did not confirm those numbers.
The U.S. government has funded extensive upgrades to facilities in both Aktau and Semipalatinsk.
In an e-mail response to questions submitted by The Times, officials at the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provided details of the operation, saying the plan was motivated by security needs - namely a desire to move the material out of a population center and to protect a primary oil port from potential nuclear sabotage.
But the officials could not immediately say how much the U.S. government has spent.
Mr. Bunn of Harvard, who reviewed federal budget documents, said the total cost of canning, curing and shipping the spent fuel runs close to $175 million.
A Government Accountability Office official said the agency has yet to produce a report on the program.
"We cover many nuclear nonproliferation programs but haven't focused on this project," said Gene Aloise, director of GAO's nuclear nonproliferation work. "Perhaps this article will spark some interest."
Raw uranium stolen from back of pickup truck
Updated: Tue Jul. 15 2008 15:35:43The Canadian Press
Police in Kingston are looking for a wooden box containing raw uranium core samples after it was stolen from the back of a pickup truck Monday night.
The truck belonged to an employee of a mining corporation that harvests core samples for geological testing.
Police say the uranium can't be used to make weapons, but does pose a radiation exposure risk should it be eaten or stored inside enclosed living spaces.
http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20080715/OTT_Kingston_Uranium_080715/20080715/?hub=OttawaHome
Updated: Tue Jul. 15 2008 15:35:43The Canadian Press
Police in Kingston are looking for a wooden box containing raw uranium core samples after it was stolen from the back of a pickup truck Monday night.
The truck belonged to an employee of a mining corporation that harvests core samples for geological testing.
Police say the uranium can't be used to make weapons, but does pose a radiation exposure risk should it be eaten or stored inside enclosed living spaces.
http://ottawa.ctv.ca/servlet/an/local/CTVNews/20080715/OTT_Kingston_Uranium_080715/20080715/?hub=OttawaHome
Stolen Copper Radioactive Tue July 22, 2008 - Bedford Co., VA
Some thieves are in danger. They stole from a local TV transmitter site, but probably didn't realize what they took is radioactive. They may also not have realized they were caught on tape.
The suspects broke into the secured area on Thaxton Mountain where the FOX 21 broadcast tower is. They took a very expensive broadcasting tube and it contains hazardous materials and even some radiation. It looks like the thieves rammed their truck through a gate, then stole the tube from right outside the transmission building on top of the mountain.
They were caught on surveillance video. You can see the pickup truck making a getaway. Workers here assume they stole the tube for its copper. They also tried to break in to the actual building, but were not successful.
Little do they know that much of the tube's copper was taken out. What was left behind is potentially dangerous.
Robert Lynch, Fox 21/27 - "It's not something that you want to handle. And we hope that whoever did this can see this video and know they are dealing with a hazardous substance that could be dangerous to them."
We are very close to our very own ABC-13 transmitter and tower. It seems the thieves went though an old car there but didn't take anything, but because they stole from a broadcast facility, they are facing a federal charge.
http://www.wset.com/news/stories/0708/537768.html
Some thieves are in danger. They stole from a local TV transmitter site, but probably didn't realize what they took is radioactive. They may also not have realized they were caught on tape.
The suspects broke into the secured area on Thaxton Mountain where the FOX 21 broadcast tower is. They took a very expensive broadcasting tube and it contains hazardous materials and even some radiation. It looks like the thieves rammed their truck through a gate, then stole the tube from right outside the transmission building on top of the mountain.
They were caught on surveillance video. You can see the pickup truck making a getaway. Workers here assume they stole the tube for its copper. They also tried to break in to the actual building, but were not successful.
Little do they know that much of the tube's copper was taken out. What was left behind is potentially dangerous.
Robert Lynch, Fox 21/27 - "It's not something that you want to handle. And we hope that whoever did this can see this video and know they are dealing with a hazardous substance that could be dangerous to them."
We are very close to our very own ABC-13 transmitter and tower. It seems the thieves went though an old car there but didn't take anything, but because they stole from a broadcast facility, they are facing a federal charge.
http://www.wset.com/news/stories/0708/537768.html
You can see video at http://www.wset.com/news/stories/0708/537768_video.html?ref=newsstory
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